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Abstract. This paper demonstrates that the political mobilization of regional identities through the 
creation of regionalist parties has positively impacted on the development of region-specific models 
of welfare governance in Italy. This means that, in a decentralized country, the ‘centre-periphery’ 
cleavage may significantly influence the sub-state politics of welfare.  
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Introduction 
The welfare state played a very important role in the process of state- and nation- building. Indeed it 
emerged in a period of structuring and closure of national boundaries, which framed the struggles 
between cross-local, ‘functional’ alliances. Most of the literature on the welfare state has focused on 
the impact that class politics had on the structuring of welfare regimes (Esping Andersen, 1990) 
without paying too much attention to territorial issues. This is not surprising, since the creation of 
centralized and homogeneous welfare states did not seem compatible with sub-state regional 
differentiation. According to Rokkan, the last task of central political elites in the construction of 
nation-states was ‘the creation of territorial economic solidarity through measures to equalize 
benefits and opportunities both across regions and across strata of the population’ (quoted in Flora, 
1999: 58). Generally, the external boundaries of social protection tended to coincide from the very 
beginning with the borders of the nation state even in ‘conservative’ welfare regimes where 
important differences among occupational categories persisted.  
However, since the mid-1970s welfare states across Europe have undergone a process of 
restructuring. This last phase is not only characterized by functional fragmentation and 
‘privatization’ of national social protection but also by its increasing ‘territorialization’. Indeed, in 
some countries regional governments have become important, sometimes central, actors in the 
elaboration and implementation of social policies (Ferrera, 2005; McEwen and Moreno, 2005; 
Kazepov 2010). Thus in many post-industrial societies the ‘new politics of welfare’ is more and more 
shaped by territorial, region-specific factors rather than ‘state-wide’ political struggles.  
Given this general picture, it would be interesting to see whether and why, in decentralized 
countries, some regions are more successful than others in (re-)constructing subnational models of 
welfare that may complement and even aspire to replace the national one. I call them strong models 
of regional welfare. Thus, contrary to the l idea of ‘race to the bottom’ (Cameron, 1978; Mishra 
1999) that has also inspired neoliberal supporters of decentralization, I expect to see substantial 
variation in the level of welfare development across the regions of a decentralized country. Indeed, 
whereas some regions may become real promoters of welfare (re)building (Moreno, 2011), others 
may be totally unable to play this role.  
In order to better understand which political factors may produce such divergence, I focus 
on Italy, where, since the 1980s, regions have been significantly empowered and national 
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institutions have ceased to play an almost exclusive role as providers of social protection. Many large 
and medium-sized European countries (e.g. UK, Spain [Keating, 2009] and Belgium [Béland and 
Lecours, 2008]) have undergone similar processes and the framework that I use in this paper may 
therefore be applied to other cases.  
By considering regional party politics over the last three decades, the main hypothesis of this 
paper is that the mobilization of regional identities and solidarities through regionalist parties has 
become the main driving force in the construction of region-specific welfare systems. So far, only 
Béland and Lecours (2008) have systematically focused on the link between ‘sub-state nationalism’ 
and welfare development. However, their study mainly refers to secessionist mobilization in multi-
ethnic countries and does not include Italy, where regionalist mobilization has not been exclusively 
based on historical or ethnic nationalism but has also emerged as a result of persisting socio-
economic inequalities and increasing instability of the national party system. The Italian case can 
therefore broaden the scope of research on the interaction between regionalist mobilization, 
decentralization and social policy.    
In the next section I present a brief historical overview of the evolution of social policies in 
Italy. Then I provide a definition and operationalization of regional welfare development and I show 
that there is considerable territorial variation in Italy. After quantitatively testing the ‘regionalist 
mobilization’ hypothesis, I provide a more in-depth analysis of two regional cases: Bolzano/South 
Tyrol and Lombardy. The time frame of this article is the period from 1980 to 2010. Therefore, the 
effect of recent political developments (e.g. the emergence of new parties like the Five Stars 
Movement) has not been assessed, since data on the post-2010 period are still quite fragmented.  
 
The Italian case 
Although initially classified as a ‘conservative’ welfare system (Esping-Andersen, 1990), Italy has 
often been included in the group of ‘southern European’ or ‘Mediterranean’ welfare states 
characterized by high fragmentation, clientelism and underdeveloped social services (Ferrera 1996). 
Only in the 1970s elements of universalism were added to the Italian model. Indeed in 1978 the 
insurance-based and highly fragmented healthcare system was replaced by a national healthcare 
system (Sistema Sanitario Nazionale, SSN), which was universal and taxation-based (like the British 
and Scandinavian systems). 
However, the creation of the SSN was accompanied by the strengthening of regional 
authorities and this eventually led to increasing territorial fragmentation of the welfare state. 
Regional assemblies and governments were created in 1970 (although 4 special regions and two 
autonomous provinces had been created much earlier) but only in 1977 they were granted some 
 4 
 
(very limited) powers in the area of social assistance (Fargion, 1997: 97 – 107). In 1992-1993 the 
crisis of the Italian welfare system became evident (Ferrera and Gualmini, 2004) and the process of 
regionalization accelerated. Regions became important actors in the administration of healthcare, 
taking some power away from both central government and municipalities (Ferrera, 2006: 206–211). 
Finally, with the constitutional reform ratified in 2001, regional levels of government were entrusted 
with primary responsibility in three social policy fields: healthcare, social assistance and active labour 
market policies (Fargion, 2005). Social insurance, including pension schemes and unemployment 
benefits, is still controlled by central authorities (although, as I will show, there are some regional 
exceptions). 
In this context, it is important to answer the questions of whether and why some regions 
have been more able or willing to exploit the opportunities offered by increasing decentralization 
and establish what I define as ‘strong’ model of welfare. 
 
Beyond social spending: defining and measuring welfare development at the regional level 
Political economists often use aggregate spending figures as indicators of welfare effort (Swank, 
2002). One could therefore argue that the more a regional government spends on healthcare, 
employment policies, social assistance, education etc., the stronger is the role it plays as provider of 
social protection. Of course, spending represents an important aspect of the government’s degree 
of activism in a specific policy sector. Indeed, as underlined by Costa-Font and Greer (2013: 17) ‘no 
money equates to no policy’. However, it is not sufficient to know how much a government spends if 
we want to explain the development of policies, such as healthcare and important sectors of social 
assistance, which are increasingly service-oriented (Hemerjick, 2013). Indeed, it would be equally 
important to know to what extent regional governments try to plan services in an integrated way 
and promote their innovation through extensive legislation.  
Both spending and planning/legislation can be seen as the ‘input’ side of the welfare system. 
In order to have a full picture, however, one should also consider the ‘output’ side, that is, the level 
of effective implementation and coverage of social schemes once they have been established 
(Pavolini, 2008). For example, in their assessment of the role played by territorial levels in the 
governance of social policies, Barberis et al. (2010: 373) consider three areas of responsibility: 
planning/programming, financing and administering/managing/delivering. Again, this latter factor 
is clearly more important in the case of social services than in the case of cash benefits. Since regions 
provide social protection mainly in the form of service-oriented programmes (Fargion, 1997; Ferrera, 
2005; Kazepov, 2010), it is crucial to include this dimension, which also includes coverage rates, in 
our definition. 
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To sum up, we have a ‘strong’ model of welfare at the regional level when sub-national 
institutions play a central role in 1) financing and 2) planning social programmes (input) and when 3) 
these social programmes are effectively (and extensively) implemented and administered (output). 
All these three aspects should coexist in order to consider regions as real centres of welfare 
development. High spending alone does not make a regional welfare ‘strong’ unless it is combined 
with extensive local planning and effective implementation of social services. At the same time, 
focusing on the well-functioning and high coverage of social services to detect the existence region-
specific models of welfare governance does not make a lot of sense if the financial and legislative 
input of sub-national political actors is null or very weak. Finally, extensive social legislation can be 
considered as an indicator of regional welfare development only when it is supported by concrete 
actions of regional governments (i.e. spending) and results in social services that are effectively 
implemented and support a large share of potential beneficiaries. Therefore rather than adding the 
three factors, it would be more correct to multiply them since all three are considered essential for 
detecting a strong model of welfare. This procedure is suggested by Goerz (2006: 95–127), who 
underlines the importance of ‘concept-measure consistency’. The resulting formula would be: 
Strength of regional welfare= (spending*planning/legislation*effective implementation) 
Spending can be measured in terms of aggregate per-capita spending in two policy areas: social 
assistance and healthcare. The data are provided by the Ministry of Economic Development and 
cover the 1996—2011 period. As shown in table 1, total social spending is highest in Valle D’Aosta 
and lowest in Campania. We can assign the score 1 to the leading region, thus rescaling all the other 
regions to a 0–1 range. This is a useful empirical exercise aimed at avoiding ‘scale effects’ when 
multiplying spending with planning/innovation and efficiency that, as shown in the next sections, will 
also be rescaled to a 0-1 range. 
 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
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In order to assess the role that regional governments play in planning social programmes I use the 
data provided by Pavolini (2008), who in turn relies on reports by Mapelli (2007) and Maretti (2008). 
He provides scores that, on the basis of regional legislation, assess the planning and innovation 
capacity of regional governments in the period that goes from the early 1990s to the late 2000s. 
Pavolini’s study considers social assistance and healthcare policies. The score of planning for social 
assistance ranges from 0 (inexistent) to 3 (very strong), whereas the one for healthcare ranges from 
0 (inexistent) to 4 (very strong). I rescaled each of these scores to a 0 to 1 range (1 being the 
maximum and 0 the minimum) and then calculated the sum. Finally I assigned the score 1 to the 
region with the highest sum and adjusted the other scores proportionally. Results are summarised in 
table 2. It can be noted that Tuscany is the region with the highest capacity to plan and innovate, 
followed Lombardy and Aosta Valley, whereas Campania is at the bottom of the ranking. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Finally, I turn to the third dimension, that is, effective implementation of social services. In this case I 
rely on data collected by Mapelli (2007) and the Italian Statistical Office (ISTAT). Most of these data 
have also been summarized by Pavolini (2008). Mapelli has provided a healthcare score that is 
measured through a bi-dimensional scale ranging from 0 to 100 and considers both the 
implementation process and the final performance of healthcare services. I have also used Eurostat 
data that indicate the average number of hospital beds and long-term care places per 100,000 
inhabitants over the last two decades. Finally I have also taken into account the percentage of 
children and old people that have access to specific social services (ISTAT data that are also reported 
in Pavolini [2008]). 
Also in this case, all measures have been rescaled to a 0-1 scale, where 1 is the best score 
and the other scores are proportionally adjusted, and their sum has been calculated. The region with 
the highest sum is in turn assigned a score of 1 and, again, the other results are adjusted. Results are 
presented in table 3. Trento, Aosta Valley and Emilia Romagna are the regions where welfare 
services are generally most efficient. Calabria, Apulia, Campania and Basilicata are the worst 
performing regions.  
[Table 3 about here] 
Table 4 shows the results of the multiplicative index of welfare development, which may range from 
a maximum of 1 to a minimum of 0. In reality, no region scores 1 in all the three dimensions, thus 
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obtaining the maximum possible final score. Yet regions such as Aosta Valley, South Tyrol and 
Lombardy score consistently well and therefore have the highest multiplicative scores. On the 
contrary, Sicily, Apulia, Calabria and Campania have consistently low scores and, consequently, they 
are at the bottom of the ranking. Generally, it can be noted that there is significant variation in the 
development of health and social assistance policies across Italian regions. Next section refers to the 
main hypothesis of this study and provides an explanation of territorial variation in welfare 
development by focusing on different levels of territorial mobilization in Italian regions. The general 
question that will be answered is whether the centre-periphery cleavage has affected the process of 
welfare building at the sub-national level. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
 
 
Territorial mobilization in Italian regions 
The literature on multi-level party politics has paid increasingly attention to the regionalization of 
party systems and to the emergence of regionalist political parties (De Winter and Türstan, 1998; 
Hough and Jeffery, 2006; Swenden and Maddens, 2009; Alonso, 2012). Such parties are often the 
expression of ‘sub-state nationalism’ highlighting the ethnic or civic (but also socio-economic) 
diversity of a ‘peripheral’ region (Keating, 2001). This type of political mobilization is linked to the 
‘centre-periphery’ cleavage, which has been defined by Lipset and Rokkan as 
 
local oppositions to encroachments of the aspiring or the dominant national elites and 
their bureaucracies: the typical reactions of peripheral regions, linguistic minorities, and 
culturally threatened populations to the pressures of the centralizing, standardizing, and 
‘rationalizing’ machinery of the nation-state. (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 14) 
 
By focusing on the centre-periphery cleavage, regionalist parties are likely to challenge welfare 
centralism and promote a system of social protection that is more distinctive and linked to the needs 
of local communities. As underlined by Béland and Lecours (2008), regional social policy may be used 
to foster sub-national solidarities and identities that in turn reinforce the centre-periphery cleavage. 
This means that the political mobilization of regional identities may have a positive impact on the 
development of region-specific social policies in decentralized systems. On the contrary, in those 
regions dominated by state-wide parties the construction of regional networks of solidarity is not a 
salient issue, since such networks may undermine the territorial integrity of the nation-state.  
Yet it should also be underlined that the emergence of politically organized territorial 
movements may also have an influence on the preferences and actions of the regional branches of 
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‘state-wide’ parties that were not primarily created on the basis of the centre-periphery cleavage. 
This is even more evident in a context in which state-wide political parties are increasingly 
characterized by ‘stratarchical’ organizational structures (Carty, 2004; Katz and Mair, 2009). In such 
context, regional party branches of state-wide parties may adopt stronger territorial party identities 
and rhetoric and may call for greater organizational and programmatic differentiation from the 
centre (Hepburn, 2010). 
Since 1980, the strength of regionalist parties in Italian regions has increased substantially, 
as shown in table 5. In the 1980s regionalist mobilization was already strong only in South Tyrol-
Bolzano, Aosta Valley, Trento and Sardinia, whereas it has emerged more recently in other regions, 
such as Lombardy, Friuli Venetia Giulia and Veneto.  
 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
 
Testing the hypothesis 
In this section I quantitatively test the hypothesis that the strength of regionalist parties1 has been 
positively associated to the development of regional systems of social governance. A preliminary 
analysis based on a bivariate correlation suggests that there is a positive and strong association 
between these two variables (r = 0.81).  
 Yet some control variables should be included in the model in order to fully test the validity 
of the ‘territorial mobilization’ hypothesis. Indeed, other socio-economic, political, institutional and 
demographic factors may explain cross-regional variation in the provision of healthcare and social 
assistance and should therefore be taken into account.  
First of all, I include a variable that considers average economic development and social 
capital2 (Putnam, 1993) of the regions in the 1980-2010 period. Since these two factors are highly 
correlated (r= 0.92) their standardized values have been added to form an index of ‘socio-economic 
development’. It is well known that central-northern Italian regions are much more socio-
economically developed than southern regions and this may explain great part of cross-regional 
differences in welfare development. Indeed, under-developed regions have fewer economic and 
human resources that can be used to build autonomous systems of social protection and may still 
heavily rely on the support of the central government.  
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‘Power-resource’ literature has linked the development of welfare systems to the strength 
of left wing (especially social-democratic) parties (Hicks and Swank, 1984; Korpi and Palme, 2003). 
Regionalist literature has also underlined the fact that social democratic and progressive parties may 
try to set out a new level of welfare provision at the regional level that complements national 
welfare systems (Keating, 2007; Greer, 2010). One may expect that regions in which centre-left 
parties are politically stronger will have a more developed system of welfare governance. Therefore, 
in the model I include a control variable accounting for the strength of the Left, which is measured 
by the percentage of council seats controlled by centre-left parties in the 1980-2010 period in each 
region.  
I then consider the existence of institutional asymmetries. I use the Regional Authority Index 
(RAI) developed by Hooghe et al. (2010), measuring the levels of autonomy and power of regional 
institutions on a scale from 0 to 24, and calculate the average score over the period considered 
(1980—2010). In this way I account for the fact that some Italian regions have more formal powers 
and fiscal autonomy than others and may therefore be in a more privileged position when 
elaborating and implementing social policies. 
‘Demographic vulnerability’ may be another factor explaining variation in the attention 
devoted by sub-national administrations to social policies. Indeed, as underlined by Fésüs et al 
(2008: 3), ageing will lead to significant increases in public expenditure and will require more 
planning in the fields of health and long-term care. In order to measure demographic vulnerability, I 
consider the average share of regional population aged 65 and above in the 1980-2010 period. 
Finally, I control for the population size of the regions. Since the sample includes very small 
regions such as Aosta Valley and Molise having 100,000 and 300,000 inhabitants and very large ones 
like Lombardy having almost 10 million inhabitants, this variable may explain some variation.  
The results of the multiple regression model are indicated in table 6. Since the independent 
variables are measured differently, I used standardized coefficients so that their magnitude can be 
more easily compared. It can be noted that the standardized coefficient of territorial mobilization is 
the by far the strongest one (0.9). This means that even if we hold constant all the main social, 
political, institutional and demographic characteristics of regions, the variable measuring the 
strength of regionalist parties remains the most relevant one in explaining cross-regional variation in 
the development of social governance.  
 
[Table 6 about here] 
To complement the quantitative analysis presented in this section, I now turn to the analysis 
of two cases of highly developed sub-national welfare regimes in Italy: Bolzano/South Tyrol, 
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Lombardy. The first region, representing the larger group of ‘alpine regions’ including Aosta Valley 
and Trento, shows that a strong regional identity and its political mobilization have played a very 
important role in the construction of a highly developed and distinctive welfare system. The second 
one provides a more dynamic picture. Indeed, in Lombardy regionalist mobilization has emerged 
only in the 1990s and, unlike South Tyrolean regionalism, does not have any historical or cultural 
root. However, the growing salience of the centre-periphery cleavage, mainly based on socio-
economic factors, has had an important impact on the recent development of Lombard social 
policies, which have become increasingly peculiar and innovative.  
Additionally, I show that despite being both at the top of the ranking of welfare 
development, these two regions show substantial qualitative differences in the administration and 
structuring of social programmes. These discrepancies mainly depend on the different visions of 
welfare that inspire regionalist movements.  
 
South Tyrol 
Using a rokkanian expression, South Tyrol can be defined as an ‘inter-face’ region. Despite being part 
of the Italian state, the majority of its population is linguistically and culturally closer to Austria. 
More generally, South Tyrol belongs to what Caramani and Mény (2004) have defined as ‘alpine’ 
macro-region, also including Aosta Valley, Switzerland, Austria and Bavaria. This macro-region has 
experienced a relatively recent and very rapid process of economic expansion and is characterized 
by high levels of political consensualism, moderatism (although mixed with elements of populism) 
and attachment to the alpine traditions.  
It is therefore not surprising that South Tyrol has been for many decades dominated by a 
strong regionalist party, the Südtiroler Volkspartei (SVP), which very well represents the ‘alpine 
culture’. The SVP is positioned at the centre of the political spectrum and, although it has not been 
the only regionalist party active in South Tyrol, it has been by far the largest one, controlling the 
absolute majority of seats and the regional government until 2013. 
In the development of regional social policies the SVP seems to have followed the 
alpine/conservative idea that the social cohesion of the local community and traditional social 
structures should be preserved through social programmes that are much more generous than the 
national ones. Additionally, although social initiatives promoted by private actors are welcomed, the 
SVP has generally been suspicious of processes of privatization and market-based competition3. This 
may be seen as the defensive response of the traditionalist alpine culture against processes of 
extreme liberalization that might undermine social harmony (Caramani and Mény, 2005; Pallaver, 
2005).  
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As argued by Sagner (2011), the traditional family is conceived as the centre of the South 
Tyrolean welfare system which mixes very generous monetary transfers with well-developed in-kind 
services of social assistance. According to the latest data provided by ISSiRFA4, per capita cash 
benefits (particularly maternity benefits) directly transferred by regional institutions to families are 
above 500 euros in South Tyrol, whereas the average of the 21 Italian regions is just 26 euros. It is 
also significant that, unlike in many other Italian regions, in South Tyrol (but also in Aosta Valley) the 
regional ‘ministry’ of social assistance is explicitly called department of ‘family and social policies’. 
This strong support for the family should not be confused with ‘familialism’ that can be generally 
found in southern European welfare systems and, particularly, in the Italy-wide welfare system. 
Indeed, whereas the ‘family-oriented’ welfare system of South Tyrol actively supports the family 
through extensive public policies, generous money transfers and efficient services, the ‘familialistic’ 
welfare system does not provide such active and extensive support but, due to its inertia, burdens 
families with additional responsibilities in the provision of social care. As pointed out by Flaquer 
(2000), ‘in Southern Europe it is taken for granted that it is up to households to provide for the 
welfare of their members and therefore no emphasis is placed on family policy’ (italics added).  
Another interesting point is that South Tyrol has developed a system of social protection 
that tends to ‘crystallize’ the socio-economic status of the beneficiaries, as happens in ‘conservative’ 
welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990), also through a system of integrative pension schemes set 
by the region between the early 1990s and early 2000s (Sagner, 2011: 174; Ferrera, 2005: 201). At 
the same time, a rather advanced and extended system of income support for vulnerable social 
groups has been established. In particular, South Tyrol is one of the few Italian regions that have 
introduced a ‘basic guaranteed income’ and a ‘housing benefit’ mainly targeted at unemployed but 
also at students, pensioners and other economically vulnerable groups. In 2010 the two programmes 
benefited between 2.1 and 2.8 per cent of the population (Sagner, 2011: 160), a rather high figure in 
a region where unemployment is below 3 per cent (ISTAT). 
Of course, the financial generosity of the South Tyrolean welfare system is also explained by 
the fact that this region enjoys some fiscal autonomy (it is a ‘Special Statute Region’). However, as 
shown in the quantitative analysis, formal institutional asymmetries are weakly correlated to welfare 
development in Italian regions and, in any case, do not help explain how economic resources are 
allocated and administered. Indeed, welfare governance in South Tyrol is mainly the outcome of a 
political process which sees the regionalist party SVP as the undisputed protagonist.  
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Lombardy 
Until the early 1990s Lombardy was the basis of electoral support for the Christian Democratic Party 
(DC), the dominant party in central government, and the Socialist Party (PSI), its junior coalition 
partner. This perhaps explains the scarce attention that pre-1990 regional governments paid to the 
development of region-specific social policies (Ciarini, 2012). However, in the early 1990s Lombardy 
became the centre of an electoral earthquake that would completely change the Italian party system 
and make the centre-periphery cleavage very salient in the political debate (Fargion, 2005). Indeed 
the Lombard League, a regionalist party which then merged with other regionalist parties and 
became the Northern League, mobilized a very large share of the Lombard electorate on the basis of 
a platform that called for increasing regional autonomy and fiscal federalism. Since 1990 the League 
has been a very important political actor in Lombardy, winning between 15 and 50 per cent of the 
Lombard seats allocated in general or regional elections.  
Unlike the SVP, the Northern League could not appeal to ethnic or cultural regionalism but, 
rather, stressed the fact that Lombardy was the wealthiest Italian region and its dynamic economy 
was ‘exploited’ by the central government. As underlined by Golden (2004), the Northern League 
attracted the support of those entrepreneurs and productive groups that saw central political elites 
as an obstacle to their economic competitiveness in the global markets.  
Of course, soon the Northern League started promoting an ‘invented ethnicity’ and tried to 
set some historical and cultural foundations to its claims of self-determination. However it always 
combined these cultural aspects with ‘individualism, hard work and free market values’ (Ginsborg, 
1996: 30). It is thus no surprise that soon the party positioned itself on the right of the political 
spectrum and established an alliance with Berlusconi’s pro-market, conservative party (Forza Italia, 
later called PdL) created in 1994. This contributed to the creation of a hegemonic political block in 
Northern Italy, and particularly in Lombardy, based on a mix of market values, populism and 
localism. 
This new dominant coalition has been very active in the promotion of a Lombard model of 
welfare. Unlike the SVP, the Northern League has not monopolized the process of welfare building 
since it acted as a junior, although very influential, coalition partner of a state-wide political party. 
Moreover, the Lombard healthcare reform was approved at the end of the 1990s, before the formal 
involvement of the League in the centre-right regional government. As underlined by Maino (2001) 
and Gori (2005), the Lombard branch of Forza Italia-PdL and its leaders played a very important role 
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in the transformation of the Lombard welfare system with the support of important interest and 
business groups.  
However, even if indirectly, regionalist mobilization set the conditions favouring the process 
of sub-national welfare building. First of all, it put an end to the supremacy of political forces such as 
the Christian Democrats and its allies that considered Lombardy as an electoral fiefdom 
consolidating their control on the central government. With the rise of the Northern League, 
Lombardy ceased to be a safe power basis on which central elites could rely and in fact became a 
challenger of the national government. Moreover, the increasing saliency of the centre-periphery 
cleavage in Lombard politics could not be ignored by the local leaders of the new state-wide party 
founded by Berlusconi, who saw the League as an important ally but also as a competitor on the 
centre-right. Finally, as already mentioned, the Northern League strengthened and stabilized the 
front of supporters of a market-based model of welfare, which, if efficiently implemented, would 
become an additional element of distinctiveness of the region.  
As shown in the quantitative part of this paper, today the Lombard welfare system is one of 
the best working ones in Italy and provides an extensive set of services to Lombard citizens. 
However, the provision of such services is not fully controlled by the public sector. As underlined by 
Gori (2005), the long-term plan of the Lombard regional government is to privatize the provision of 
social services, while assigning the role of financier and regulator to the public sector. Indeed, 
competition among private service providers is thought to make the allocation of public funds more 
efficient. In the healthcare sector, the main principle that has driven healthcare reforms in Lombardy 
is that ‘money follows the patients’ and this should reward those providers that are able to attract a 
larger number of ‘citizens-costumers’ (Neri, 2008: 107).  Table 7 shows that the percentage of in-
patients treated in private hospitals has increased considerably in Lombardy from 1995 to 2010 
whereas it has remained stable, at relatively low levels, in Tuscany and South Tyrol.  
 
[Table  7 about here] 
 
Also in the sector of social assistance, Lombardy emerges as the most market-oriented 
region. Indeed, with the establishment of a system of vouchers (Gori, 2005; Giunco, 2011; Pesenti, 
2005), Lombard citizens are free to choose their service providers, which therefore have to compete 
in order to attract the largest share of customers and obtain public funds. The highly distinctive 
welfare system of Lombardy is therefore based on the figure of the ‘individual-costumer’, who is 
given full freedom of choice in a competing system of service providers (Pavolini, 2004: 192). In 
summation, regionalist mobilization has created the conditions for the construction of a peculiar 
 14 
 
model of welfare that tries to promote Lombard citizens’ well being by fostering private 
participation in social assistance. 
Despite this generally positive picture, in more recent years the Lombard system has 
undergone a period of crisis due to some corruption scandals that have unveiled the collusion 
between the regional political elite and the private associations that have promoted the 
marketization of the Lombard welfare system. Yet these scandals have not resulted in a change of 
orientation of the regional government and have actually increased the strength of the Northern 
League in the regional government. Indeed, Roberto Formigoni, president of the regions since 1995 
and member of Forza Italia-PdL, has been replaced by Roberto Maroni, new leader of the Northern 
League, who won the regional election in 2013 with the support of a ‘renewed’ centre-right 
coalition. Thus, despite its electoral defeat in the 213 general election, today the Northern League 
has become the leading party of the Lombard government. So far, this ‘change of the guard’ within 
the dominant centre-right coalition has not produced any substantial change in the type of welfare 
model promoted in Lombardy, thus supporting once again the fact that the League has also been an 
important promoter of the ‘market-based’ model of welfare established in Lombardy. In his election 
programme, Maroni underlines the importance of further developing the ‘open’ healthcare system 
of the region based on the ‘freedom of choice between public and private sectors’. The same 
programme also underlines the fundamental role of the 1997 reform of the healthcare system that 
started the process of ‘new’ welfare building in Lombardy (Northern League-Maroni, Election 
Programme ‘La Nostra Lombardia’, 2013: 18). 
The League has not been strong only in Lombardy. Here it is worth mentioning another 
region in which the League has been successful, Veneto, which seems the most puzzling case in this 
study. Indeed, in the quantitative analysis presented above, Veneto has an intermediate score of 
welfare development, well below that of other regions in which regionalist mobilization has been 
strong. One possible explanation of this ‘Venetian exception’ can be found in the context in which 
Venetian territorial mobilization emerged. Indeed, Veneto is often considered as the best example of 
Italian region in which a deep and socially diffuse political sub-culture1 influenced by Catholicism has 
developed and remained very strong over most of the 20th century (Baccetti and Messina, 2009). It 
is therefore not surprising that such sub-culture has also influenced the Venetian branch of the 
Northern League, once it replaced the Christian Democratic party as the dominant political force in 
part of the region (Bull and Gilbert, 2001: 102). Subsidiarity has been one of the main principles 
supported by social Catholicism and this has resulted in more emphasis on the social role of 
municipalities and local organizations rather than on the role of the regional government. Given this 
                                                          
1 In other Italian regions Catholicism has also been strong but it has not been the basis for the development of 
a highly developed and integrated civil society. 
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historical legacy, the Venetian welfare system has developed as a ‘polycentric’ system and the 
strengthening of regional autonomy and identity seems to have contributed to the consolidation and 
development of a local-based, rather than region-centric, social system (Ciarini, 2012: 145–148). 
Since the data used for the quantitative part mainly refer to the level of development of policies 
directly promoted and planned by the regional government, they may have not captured the high 
development of social policies promoted at the sub-regional level.  
Additionally, other qualitative data, which could not be included in the quantitative analysis, 
seem to suggest that Veneto has also been an arena of development of innovative social policies. For 
instance, a regional solidarity found was established in the 1990s to promote individual retirement 
savings (Ferrera, 2005: 201). The stress on complementary pension schemes for some specific 
sectors of the labour force makes Veneto partly similar to alpine regions such as South Tyrol, Aosta 
Valley and Trento, although in the Venetian case social partners (catholic trade unions and 
employers’ organizations) seem to play a more active role. 
The fact that the region-wide welfare model of Veneto is not as well defined as the Lombard 
one may be also due to political dynamics within the Northern League. This party can be defined as 
‘macro-regionalist’, since it is a federation of different regionalist movements that merged in the 
early 1990s. The Lombard League, originally led by Umberto Bossi, who then became the leader of 
the whole confederation, has always been the centre of the confederated organization. The regional 
branches of the Northern League have had little influence in the highly centralized policy 
formulation process of the League dominated by the Lombard leadership of Umberto Bossi and his 
closest allies (Tambini, 2001: 92),. Lombardy has therefore been more relevant in the political 
strategies of the macro-regionalist party and in the formation of its social and political alliances. Of 
course, things have significantly changed in the late 2000s with the increase in electoral support for 
the Venetian League. This has been combined with the crisis of the Lombard leadership of the 
League (the downfall of Umberto Bossi in 2012). The quantitative data used in this study only 
marginally refer to the late 2000s and, therefore, they may have not detected the effects of these 
recent changes in political equilibriums.  
At the same time, as pointed out by Hopkin (2008), within the internal organization of the 
state-wide party Forza Italia-PdL, the Lombard branch has de facto acted as an autonomous 
territorial party, following an independent political line and forming social and political alliances with 
a broad range of regional interest groups. This has not occurred in the Venetian branch of the party. 
Therefore, territorial mobilization and region-specific issues may become important also within 
state-wide political parties that are characterized by a stratarchical political organization. These 
intra-party dynamics were not detected by the quantitative analysis and this points to the 
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importance of combining quantitative and qualitative analyses (the ‘nested’ analysis proposed by 
Lieberman [2005]) in order to maximize the validity of social and political research. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has shown that in a decentralized country like Italy the regions that more actively 
promote the construction of sub-national systems of welfare governance are those ones in which 
the saliency of the centre-periphery cleavage is stronger. This result seems valid even if left-right 
politics, socio-economic development, institutional asymmetries and demographic vulnerability are 
accounted for. Regionalist parties may use region-specific social policies in order to strengthen 
regional distinctiveness and, by politicizing it, increase or stabilize their electoral strength. Of course, 
as shown by the South Tyrolean and Lombard examples, regionalist parties (and regional branches of 
state-wide parties) may end up building qualitatively different models of welfare depending on the 
role that they play in the regional party system and on their ideas of social justice.  
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Tables 
Table 1.  Average regional spending in Healthcare and Social Assistance (1996—2011) 
 Healthcare Social 
Assistance 
Total 
Spending 
0 – 1 
score 
Aosta Valley 2013 464 2477 1 
Bolzano- South Tyrol 1754 569 2323 0.94 
Trento 1586 673 2259 0.91 
Lombardy 1523 174 1697 0.69 
Emilia Romagna 1550 144 1694 0.68 
Umbria 1590 87 1677 0.68 
Sardinia 1408 190 1598 0.65 
Tuscany 1419 106 1525 0.62 
Veneto 1410 107 1517 0.61 
Friuli Venetia Giulia 1283 221 1504 0.61 
Latium 1372 114 1486 0.6 
Piedmont 1347 109 1456 0.59 
Marche 1339 111 1450 0.59 
Calabria 1357 47 1404 0.57 
Abruzzi 1298 76 1374 0.55 
Liguria 1261 110 1371 0.55 
Sicily 1233 117 1350 0.55 
Basilicata 1224 73 1297 0.52 
Apulia 1238 54 1292 0.52 
Molise 1214 61 1275 0.51 
Campania 1197 59 1256 0.51 
Source: Ministry of economic development http://www.dps.tesoro.it/cpt/cpt.asp 
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Table 2. Social legislation of Italian regional governments  
  Original 
Score 
Health 
Original 
Score 
Social 
Assistance 
0-1     0-1 Sum 
rescaled 
scores 
Final  
Score Score 0-1 
Health Social 
Assistance 
Score 
Tuscany 4 2.5 1 0.833 1.833 1 
Lombardy 3 3 0.75 1 1.75 0.95 
Aosta Valley 3 3 0.75 1 1.75 0.95 
Bolzano- South Tyrol 3 2.5 0.75 0.833 1.583 0.86 
Sardinia 4 1.5 1 0.5 1.5 0.82 
Friuli Venetia Giulia 3 2 0.75 0.667 1.417 0.77 
Emilia Romagna 3 2 0.75 0.667 1.417 0.77 
Marche 4 1 1 0.333 1.333 0.73 
Umbria 3 1.5 0.75 0.5 1.25 0.68 
Liguria 3 1.5 0.75 0.5 1.25 0.68 
Abruzzi 3 1.5 0.75 0.5 1.25 0.68 
Molise 3 1.5 0.75 0.5 1.25 0.68 
Basilicata 3 1.5 0.75 0.5 1.25 0.68 
Piedmont 2 2 0.5 0.667 1.167 0.64 
Trento 1 2.5 0.25 0.833 1.083 0.59 
Veneto 1 2 0.25 0.667 0.917 0.5 
Sicily 2 1 0.5 0.333 0.833 0.45 
Apulia 3 0 0.75 0 0.75 0.41 
Latium 1 1.5 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.41 
Calabria 3 0 0.75 0 0.75 0.41 
Campania 2 0 0.5 0 0.5 0.27 
Source: Pavolini (2008)  
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Table 3. Effective implementation of social services in Italian regions  
Regions Mapelli’s Score 
Healthcare 
Hospital beds per 
100,000 inhabitants 
Long-term care 
places per 100,000 
inhabitants 
Access to childcare 
(% of children 
below 3) 
Access to elderly 
care (% of people 
above 65) 
Sum of 
rescaled 
measures 
Final 
0—1 
score 
  Original 
score 
0—1  
score 
Number 0—1 
score 
Number 0—1 
score 
Number 0—1 
score 
Number 0—1 
score 
    
Trento 61 0.77 424 0.82 885 1 15.5 0.38 5.4 0.5 3.47 1 
Aosta Valley 55 0.7 342 0.66 65 0.07 40.3 1 10.9 1 3.43 0.99 
Emilia Rom. 67 0.85 446 0.86 472 0.53 28.3 0.7 5.5 0.5 3.45 0.99 
Bolzano/ S. T. 57 0.72 466 0.9 554 0.63 9.6 0.24 8.4 0.77 3.26 0.94 
Veneto 61 0.77 397 0.77 631 0.71 10.7 0.27 7.5 0.69 3.21 0.93 
Lombardy 68 0.86 419 0.81 630 0.71 13.7 0.34 5 0.46 3.18 0.92 
Tuscany 71 0.9 381 0.74 314 0.35 20 0.5 3.2 0.29 2.78 0.8 
Friuli V.G. 79 1 391 0.76 550 0.62 10.9 0.27 5.3 0.49 3.13 0.9 
Piedmont 64 0.81 413 0.8 411 0.46 13.5 0.33 3.2 0.29 2.7 0.78 
Liguria 63 0.8 409 0.79 191 0.22 16.8 0.42 2.3 0.21 2.43 0.7 
Sardinia 34 0.43 428 0.83 85 0.1 4 0.1 9.1 0.83 2.29 0.66 
Marche 59 0.75 394 0.76 122 0.14 17.2 0.43 2 0.18 2.26 0.65 
Latium 56 0.71 517 1 99 0.11 10.3 0.26 1.9 0.17 2.25 0.65 
Umbria 67 0.85 322 0.62 224 0.25 13.7 0.34 1.6 0.15 2.21 0.64 
Molise 48 0.61 499 0.97 22 0.02 3.9 0.1 5.3 0.49 2.18 0.63 
Abruzzi 53 0.67 410 0.79 157 0.18 7.2 0.18 3.2 0.29 2.12 0.61 
Sicily 39 0.49 347 0.67 46 0.05 4.88 0.12 6.4 0.59 1.93 0.56 
Basilicata 39 0.49 333 0.64 71 0.08 5.6 0.14 1.8 0.17 1.52 0.44 
Apulia 37 0.47 378 0.73 71 0.08 5.3 0.13 1.3 0.12 1.53 0.44 
Campania 45 0.6 320 0.62 31 0.03 2.1 0.05 2.5 0.23 1.51 0.44 
Calabria 30 0.38 404 0.78 79 0.09 2.3 0.06 1.3 0.12 1.43 0.41 
Sources: Pavolini (2008); Mapelli (2007); Eurostat; ISTAT. 
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Table 4. Measuring the level of development of regional welfare systems through the 
multiplicative index  
Region Spending Legislation Implementation Multiplicative 
score  
Aosta Valley 1 0.96 0.99 0.95 
South Tyrol/Bolzano 0.94 0.86 0.94 0.76 
Lombardy 0.69 0.96 0.92 0.61 
Trento 0.91 0.59 1 0.54 
Emilia Rom. 0.68 0.78 0.99 0.53 
Tuscany 0.62 1 0.81 0.5 
FVG 0.61 0.78 0.9 0.43 
Sardinia 0.65 0.82 0.66 0.35 
Veneto 0.61 0.5 0.94 0.29 
Umbria 0.68 0.68 0.64 0.29 
Piedmont 0.59 0.64 0.78 0.29 
Marche 0.59 0.73 0.66 0.28 
Liguria 0.55 0.68 0.7 0.26 
Abruzzi 0.55 0.68 0.61 0.23 
Molise 0.51 0.68 0.63 0.22 
Latium 0.6 0.41 0.65 0.16 
Basilicata 0.52 0.68 0.44 0.16 
Sicily 0.55 0.45 0.56 0.14 
Apulia 0.52 0.41 0.45 0.1 
Calabria 0.57 0.41 0.42 0.1 
Campania 0.51 0.27 0.44 0.06 
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Table 5. The political strength of regionalist parties from 1980 to 2010 (% of council seats 
controlled by regionalist parties). Averages by region. 
 
 
 
1980S 1990S 2000S Average  
1980—2010  
South Tyrol/ Bolzano 63.7 70.6 75 70 
Aosta Valley 46.4 53.4 72.2 57.6 
Trento 12.8 33.8 53.3 34 
FVG 3 21.5 13.5 12.7 
Lombardy 0 16.7 17.8 11.7 
Veneto 0 10.3 18.2 9.8 
Sardinia 10.2 7.9 7.7 8.6 
Piedmont 0 6.7 7.7 4.9 
Liguria 0 4.7 4.1 3 
Sicily 0 0 7.1 2.5 
Emilia Romagna 0 2 4.4 2.2 
Apulia 0 0 3.7 1.3 
Molise 0 0 1.5 0.5 
Tuscany 0 0 0.5 0.2 
Marche 0 0 0.4 0.2 
Umbria 0 0 0.3 0.1 
Abruzzi, Basilicata, 
Calabria, Campania, 
Latium  
0 0 0 0 
Source: Ministero dell’Interno (www.interno.it)  
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Table 6. The determinants of welfare development (healthcare and social assistance) in the Italian 
regions (1980-2010). Multiple OLS regression. 
 
 
Standardized coefficient (β) 
Territorial mobilization .90 
Left-wing mobilization .28 
Institutional asymmetries (RAI) .10 
Index of socio economic development .18 
Demographic vulnerability .21 
Population Size  .17 
N 21 
R-squared .88 
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Table 7. Percentage of in-patients treated in private hospitals (1995–2010) 
 1995 2010 
Lombardy 11% 26.9% 
Tuscany 5.9% 7.3% 
South Tyrol 8.5% 5.1% 
Source: Italian health ministry www.salute.gov.it . Author’s own calculation.  
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1 Measured in terms of share of regional council seats won by regionalist parties between 1980 and 2010.  
2 I considered turnout in referendums, newspaper readership and participation in voluntary associations a s 
indicators of social capital. If not otherwise indicated, the data presented in this section are from the ISTAT and 
EUROSTAT websites (www.istat.it and 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/region_cities/introduction).  
3 In 2009 the healthcare minister of the province of Bolzano, Richard Theiner, stated that ‘a privatization of the 
healthcare system, which implies increasing competition between private and public sectors, is not a sensitive 
measure’. 
http://www.provinz.bz.it/sanita/attualita/news.asp?&aktuelles_action=4&aktuelles_article_id=314380 (date 
of access 3/03/2013).  
4 ISSiRFA is the Institute for the Study of Regionalism, Federalism and Self-Government,  which provides data 
on spending based on regional budgets http://www.issirfa.cnr.it/1219,1018.html  
